In Europe, people continue to talk about the ecological transition as if it were a linear, rational, almost automatic process. A process that, once the direction is set, is supposed to produce environmental, industrial, and social benefits in a progressive and harmonious manner. But while the public debate remains suspended between reassuring slogans and declarations of principle, in the industrial reality a very concrete mechanism is being built and is already fully operational. A mechanism that has only one immediately measurable effect: increasing costs throughout the entire value chain, without guaranteeing environmental results at least proportional to the effort imposed.

The EU ETS system and, even more evidently, ETS 2 are increasingly taking the form of a price multiplier. Not an instrument of industrial policy. Not an investment accelerator. But an indirect fiscal lever that generates a competitive disadvantage for European companies, hitting sectors already under heavy regulatory, financial, and operational pressure.

The central issue is simple, yet systematically ignored. These mechanisms affect operating costs, not the transformative capacity of the production system. If there are no truly effective, scalable, and infrastructure-ready technical alternatives available on a large scale, taxing fuel does not accelerate the transition. It makes labor, transportation, and production more expensive. This financial pressure does not create new industrial opportunities, but rather squeezes profit margins, reduces the liquidity available for investment, and pushes companies toward defensive rather than transformative choices.

In the transportation and logistics sector, this mechanism is already evident. The gradual introduction of ETS 2 on fuel does not automatically create zero-emission vehicles suitable for long-distance travel, nor does it create widespread, functional infrastructure. Instead, it creates an immediate increase in the cost per kilometer. That cost is passed on to the industrial client, who in turn passes it on to the final product. The result is not a structural reduction in emissions, but “green” inflation that affects businesses and consumers without actually changing production processes.

The second effect is even more insidious. Regulatory pressure is repeatedly passed down the same supply chains. Transportation, manufacturing, distribution, and retail end up bearing the same burden at different points in the value chain. The result is a ripple effect that is reflected in final prices, eroding competitiveness and suppressing demand and investment. It is not a selective push toward technological change. It is a generalized increase in system costs.

There is also a consequence that Europe is well aware of but continues to underestimate. If costs rise here but not elsewhere, the economic reaction is natural and predictable: shifting production volumes, facilities, and investments outside European borders. Global emissions do not decrease. Only the geography of production changes. The climate does not improve. European industry weakens, losing competitiveness, skilled jobs, and technological capacity.

This mechanism creates a profound paradox. Europe risks becoming the continent that taxes emissions, while the rest of the world continues to produce without comparable constraints. This is not climate leadership. It is industrial marginalization.

Added to this is a structural limitation of the ETS model. The ETS and ETS 2 still distinguish too little between those who have already invested, those who are investing, and those who, due to technological or infrastructural limitations, cannot yet do so. In the absence of a genuine transition phase, without technological neutrality that is practiced—not merely declared—we end up penalizing even the most virtuous operators. Not for lack of will, but for lack of concrete alternatives available on the market.

Decarbonization is not achieved by raising bills and fines. It cannot be built using price alone. Major industrial transformations occur when industrial policy, infrastructure, and private capital move in the same direction. The transition is achieved through investments in infrastructure, through real and efficient intermodality, through the progressive and sustainable renewal of the vehicle fleet, through genuinely available and competitive low-emission fuels, through regulatory certainty, and through timelines consistent with the industry’s ability to adapt without self-destruction.

Different institutional choices are needed. Less fiscal automatism and more supportive tools. Less ideology and more industrial pragmatism. Selective incentives for those who truly invest, European funds tied to concrete infrastructure, a revision of ETS mechanisms that transforms them from a punitive tool into a lever for real transition. And above all, a vision that brings together the environment, competitiveness, and jobs.

Without this shift in approach, the risk is clear. ETS and ETS 2 will primarily become a source of new revenue for Brussels’ coffers, while the economic and social costs are shifted onto productive regions. This imbalance undermines consensus, weakens Europe’s industrial base, and makes the transition increasingly unsustainable—even politically.

At this point, the question is not ideological but pragmatic. If the ETS and ETS 2 primarily result in extra costs and a loss of competitive advantage, what is the truly effective tool for reducing emissions without undermining jobs, investment, and industrial competitiveness in Europe? The answer cannot be yet another tax disguised as a transition measure.