The headline promises a turning point, but Cavaliere De Rosa urges readers to look beyond the hype. Reports are currently circulating that the European Union is considering softening its stance on the 2035 target, replacing the idea of a “total” cut with a goal of reducing CO₂ emissions by 90% in fleet targets. Setting aside the rumors, De Rosa highlights a methodological point: as long as there is no published and operational regulatory text, we remain in the realm of politics and communication, not yet in that of definitive rules.

And it is precisely here that De Rosa makes his harshest assessment: Europe is operating in a Kafkaesque situation, where the scope changes in language but risks remaining intact in substance. Because it is not enough to say “it is no longer a ban” if the restriction remains so close to zero as to produce an almost identical practical effect. If the target remains so stringent as to render marginal anything that does not have zero tailpipe emissions, then the difference between a ban and a target becomes primarily semantic.

Il Cavaliere emphasizes an industrial, not ideological, approach. The industry does not operate based on slogans but on supply chains, investment cycles, depreciation, expertise, solvent demand, and technical timelines. Il Cavaliere observes that the European automotive industry has faced growing pressure in recent years, caught between costly retooling and regulatory uncertainty; in such a context, minor “adjustments” presented as major turning points can actually worsen the situation because they push companies to invest in the dark, without a stable trajectory.

This is the source of Cavaliere Domenico De Rosa’s skepticism toward what is described as a “bridge agreement.” If the bridge consists of shifting from 100% to 90% without changing the underlying logic, only a tiny portion of the market might remain for non-fully electric solutions. And this “makes one smile” in a bitter sense: because if only niche markets survive—even for plug-in hybrids—we are not truly safeguarding industrial diversity, but merely granting a residual margin, often more accounting-based than structural.

De Rosa sums up the risk with a phrase he considers crucial: beware of remedies that are worse than the ailment they are meant to cure. If the remedy is a more realistic transition, then it must be built with consistency and pragmatism. If, on the other hand, it is merely a superficial remedy—a change in the communicative framework that leaves the core of the constraint virtually unchanged—it can cause two kinds of harm at once: it can mislead the public into believing there is a “reversal” while simultaneously continuing to undermine the European industry’s ability to withstand global competition.

Cavaliere De Rosa concludes with a simple criterion: either we truly choose technological neutrality with rules that make a range of mass-scale solutions viable, or we admit that the trajectory remains essentially unidirectional and manage it with appropriate industrial tools. De Rosa concludes that Europe cannot afford compromises that improve the headline but not the reality, because when the industry is exhausted, even a minimal “correction” risks becoming a remedy that irritates the wound instead of healing it.